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This is the second in a series of brief statistical reports elaborating some of the details and difficulties 
of daily life for Palestinian families during the April 2002 Israeli invasion of the West Bank. The first 
report pertained to conditions in Ramallah/al-Bireh. Here, we will focus on the city of Nablus; reports 
written by journalists, researchers, and institutions pertaining to what happened during the period of re-
invasion complement the findings of this house to house survey. The statistical reports that will follow 
include the towns of Jenin, Tulkarem and Bethlehem. A final report will sum up the individual town 
reports and will provide summary results for all the towns combined. 
 
As with Ramallah/al-Bireh, this is a house-to-house survey which identifies households as its main 
unit of analysis, offering quantitative indicators that are generalizable to all of the households and 
population of the city, estimated by PCBS to be 18003 households and a population of 100, 231 in 
1997.  The re-invasion of Nablus began on the 4th of April 2002 and ended on the 22nd. However, 
periodic re-invasions of the towns have continued up till the time of writing this report, where the 
Israeli army comes in, destroys homes and infrastructure, arrests or kills selected individuals then 
leaves.  
It should also be pointed out here that the World Bank has recently estimated the damage incurred 
during the re-invasion of the West Bank at 361 million US dollars, with the Nablus area having been 
identified as the hardest hit, and with repair costs there estimated at 114 million US Dollars. 
 
Survey Methodology 
 
This house-to-house survey was conducted during the first 10 days of May, 2002, just after the lifting 
of the curfew and the partial withdrawal of the Israeli army to the outskirts of town. A stratified 
random sample of households was chosen, primarily based on locale, and representative of all of the 
households in the city. 
 
Data Collection 
 
A sample of 154 households was selected utilizing stratified cluster sampling techniques.  The city was 
divided into 5 strata, whereby 2-3 random starting points were selected.  From each starting point a 
systematic sample of every 10th household was selected. In this survey, the expected maximum 
margin of error at the city level is: 
 
E= 1.96*DE*sqrt((P)*(Q)/(n)). 
P= the percentage of a certain attribute. 
Q=1-P. 
DE=Design Effect due to clustering. 
The estimated value of DE=1.1. 
E= 1.96*sqrt((0.5)(0.5)(1.1)/(150))=8.8%. 
 
 
Data Entry 
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Data entry was completed using the ACCESS database. Proper control structure was defined on closed 
questions.  Data was transferred to SPSS using "StatTransfer" software.  Double entry was conducted 
for a sample of the questionnaire to check for errors that could not be detected by the control structure 
defined in ACCESS. One out of 50 questionnaires experienced swapping values like 1 entered instead 
of 2 or visa versa. 
 
The Results: 
 
One hundred and fifty four household heads or adult members were interviewed. The mean age of 
respondents was 42 years. Fifty one percent were women and the rest men. Fifteen percent were 
illiterate, 27% with elementary schooling, 18% with preparatory, 25% with secondary, 8% with higher 
diplomas, 6% with bachelor’s degree (considerably less than the 20% found in Ramallah/Bireh) and 
2% master’s degree or more. While caution should be made when comparing with PCBS figures, as 
those pertain to the population 10 years or over, PCBS reports for 1997 Nablus a 6% rate of illiteracy, 
15% as being able to read and write, 63% with secondary schooling or below, 6% with post high 
school education, 9% with bachelors degrees, and 9% with more than bachelors. 
 
The average household size was 6.22 persons per household, lower than the 6.8 found for Ramallah, 
but higher than the 5.4 reported by PCBS for Nablus in 1977, again perhaps indicating a shift in 
household composition as a result of the re-invasion. The smallest household in this survey was 
composed of three persons and the largest 21. Of the total 15% only were composed of extended 
family (with three or more generations living together) again lower than the 28% found for Ramallah, 
and also lower than what has been reported for Nablus by PCBS in 1977, at 23%. 
 
Family Composition Change during Exceptional Circumstances 
 
Examining the data in relation to shifting household composition during the re-invasion, with families 
housing other families during the curfew and siege in protection against danger, and as families moved 
out of dangerous areas into perceived less dangerous ones, we find results similar to those found for 
Ramallah /Bireh. Here 29% of the respondents reported housing other families and or friends during 
the reinvasion, almost the same rate (30%) as in Ramallah/Bireh. Of those reporting housing people 
other than household members, two thirds (as in Ramallah/Bireh) reported that they were members of 
their extended family, one tenth housed neighbors (probably because the army took over their homes) 
one tenth friends (as opposed to a higher quarter in Ramallah/Bireh), and the rest a mix, even members 
of the national security, or strangers who do not live in town who were stranded. 
 
When asked why guests sought shelter in their homes, about half reported guests moved in because of 
shelling, the presence of the army close by and fear for their lives, as their areas were deemed too 
dangerous; about one tenth thought that being with family gives the feeling of safety; another one tenth 
reported the presence of a pregnant woman at home, due to deliver soon, and thought it better to move 
out  of their area presumably because health services are easier to reach where they moved; another 
one tenth  moved out of their homes because the army took the home over, occupied it and used it for 
its own purposes,  and the rest a mix of reasons such as having been used as a human shield, and 
ending up somewhere else other than home, living in a place outside and inside Nablus and stranded 
there during the re-invasion, and home destroyed by shelling. 
 
The results from Nablus seem to be comparable to those of Ramallah/Bireh, perhaps indicating a 
pattern of generalized response to emergency combined with similar conditions that led people to act 
in similar ways. Again, these results are important in that they demonstrate this temporary shift in 
household composition and internal migration in search of some safety as an important feature of 
conditions during the period and also as an important method of coping with war. Strong family and 
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communal ties become more important than usual during exceptional circumstances, and prompt 
active cooperation of families, neighbors, and friends with each other.  
 
Loss of Work 
 
Of the female respondents, 76% were housewives, and the rest, or 14% were working women: this is 
almost exactly the same level of women’s paid work as in Ramallah/ Bireh, and almost identical to the 
14.5% reported by PCBS in 1997.  Women are mostly employed in white-collar occupations. 
 
For men, 15% were employers or owner-operators in the private sector, owning a shop or running a 
private operation, a low of 5% were professionals (teachers, nurses, doctors lawyers), 24% were white 
collar workers, lower than the 32% for Ramallah al-Bireh, and a high of 38% were semi-skilled or 
unskilled workers. Fourteen percent reported themselves as having been unemployed prior to the 
invasion, compared to the 7% rate of unemployment reported by PCBS for 1997 for those ages 10 or 
above, but close to the 12% reported for Ramallah/Bireh in our survey. The rest were students. Of 
those reporting that they were working prior to the invasion, 27% reported job loss since that time. Of 
those, more than three quarters explained this new unemployment because of the collapse of the 
economy and the market since the invasion, and the rest blamed the closures and siege. These results 
are very similar to those obtained for Ramallah/Bireh and point to perhaps a generalized as opposed to 
locale specific increase in poverty levels, even beyond what was estimated by PCBS for the first six 
months of the Uprising. 
 
Unavailability of basic services  
 
Nablus suffered serious electrical current cuts during the re-invasion and curfew that had a negative 
impact not only on family life, but on commercial enterprises as well, with reports of substantial loss 
of food items that required refrigeration. In this survey, a high of 47% of respondents reported living 
without electricity for most or all of the period of re-invasion, a rate that is higher than Ramallah/Bireh 
(20%), and confirming in part the observation that Nablus was perhaps most hardly hit of all the 
towns. Being without electricity certainly complicates family life to a considerable extent, especially 
given children and additional guests as well. About 45% reported the loss of electricity for some of the 
time, and 8% reported no electrical shortages at. Just to note, electrical current interruptions also 
affected an estimated population of 14,000 people in nearby villages, as the Nablus Electric Company 
serves not only the City, but also selected nearby locales. 
 
Thirty nine percent of households reported tubed water shortages most or all of the time, a rate similar 
to that of Ramallah, again due to shelling, bombing, shooting and vandalism affecting the different 
levels of the water system. Thirty nine percent reported water shortages for part of the time, and 22% 
no water shortages at all. During such a period, people usually rely on water wells. Of the total who 
have phones, 44% had their telephone lines cut all of the time, 7% most of the time, 15% some of the 
time and the rest did not face problems with phones. 
 
The majority of households, on the other hand (84%) reported no problems with sewage disposal, with 
the rest reporting blown up sewage pipes mostly and cesspools not being emptied. As in Ramallah, the 
garbage problem was major, affecting 98% of families who said that they had serious problems getting 
rid of their garbage, mostly reporting the problem of un-emptied garbage containers, as municipal 
services came to a halt during the period.  Several families reported not being able to get the garbage 
out of the house, with garbage piling up inside their home. On the whole, given that the areas that were 
mostly affected by the violence were hardest hit in terms of loss of electricity, water and phones 
combined, family lives must have been very difficult indeed, especially among families with young 
children and elderly and disabled members. 
 
Low on Food and Cash 
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Of the total respondents, 37% reported food availability problems during the reinvasion and curfew 
period, and 43% reported food unavailability in the market, once the curfew was lifting periodically 
for people to shop for essentials.  Of the total, 33% also reported a problem of cash availability, less 
than the reports from Ramallah (54%), perhaps because either because Nablus is a strong commercial 
center or because it has more extended family support networks than Ramallah, where a first 
impressions that one gets of Ramallah might lead one to think that household cash is more abundant 
there, given Ramallah’s function as a center of institutions and government. 
 
In Nablus, the pattern was similar to Ramallah, with an initial period where there was no curfew lifting 
at all and families could not get out to buy food, followed by a period where the curfew was lifted but 
selected fresh food items were not available, followed by an easing up of the problem of food 
availability and the uncovering of the problem of cash availability. The difference here is that 
throughout the re-invasion, banks did not re-open, even for the minimal services offered in Ramallah. 
 
When asked about how the families coped when faced with low food supply, 7% began to bake their 
own bread at home (in contrast to a higher 18% in Ramallah), a high of 38% relied on families and 
friends, a significantly higher rate than in Ramallah (5%), 20% reported substituting one type of food 
with another,  and the rest gave mixed answers, with austerity measures of eating less frequently 
reported rather less than in Ramallah, and raising questions as to why this was one important method 
of coping in Ramallah, when in Nablus, it appears not to have been otherwise. Again, the higher rate of 
family reliance may be an answer.  However, and unlike Ramallah, a surprisingly high rate (about 
20%) reported substituting milk for children with tea, not only losing an important source of protein 
and calcium, but contributing to the problem of loss of food iron from the body as tea chelates iron and 
blocks its absorption. These results raise the question of the need to conduct a specific nutritional 
status of children survey that includes clinical exams focusing on anemia in childhood during 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
As for cash availability problems, Nablus residents   managed in slightly different ways than in 
Ramallah:  36% reported spending less in contrast to a higher 50% in Ramallah, ( yet eating less was 
hardly reported in Nablus, perhaps because Nabulsis store larger quantities of food at home),  30% 
borrowed money from families and friends, 28% relied on food shops loaning them food on account ( 
as in Ramallah)  8% delved into savings intended for use for purposes other than eating, and 7% 
resorted to living with what was at home(more than 100% as multiple reports were allowed). Overall, 
while families emerged out of the crisis, difficulties are not over yet, with the continuation of siege, 
collapse of the market and problems of unemployment forming serious family life problems in this 
community. 
 
Shooting, Explosion and Destruction of Property and Institutions 
 
When asked about shooting, explosions and destruction in their areas,  a high of 57% reported that 
they endured much of that during the period , almost continuously (Ramallah: a lower 29%), 29% a lot 
of the time, and 13% only a little, again confirming the observation that Nablus was harder hit than 
Ramallah. Again the results seem to be related to the area where households are located, locations in 
and near the old City suffering more damage, such as Ras al-Ein and Krum Ashour, as well as al-Quds 
and Nablus Street in the nearby vicinity. That is, the main assault seems to have been on the Old City 
and its surrounding areas, as this survey seems to indicate. 
 
In response to how households managed, 57% reported hiding in fear, lack of sleep and mental 
distress; 14% reported the family hiding in one room, speaking quietly so as not to draw the army’s 
attention to their presence,  9% reported having to pay attention to children who were in great fear, 
again crying and urinating uncontrollably on themselves, and the rest responded in a variety of ways, 
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including depression, learning the lessons and withstanding in resistance, waiting till the army came 
inside the house, or even behaving normally, at 5%, as fear has become ordinary or a way of life. 
 
Again, consistent with the above findings, a high of 67% (Ramallah: 52%) reported considerable 
destruction in their neighborhoods. Of those, a high of 44% (Ramallah 39%) reported pervasive 
destruction of retaining walls, telephones, electrical poles, shops, pavements,  cars and even traffic 
signs;  22%, as in Ramallah, reported the destruction of homes, doors, the breaking of furniture and 
windows as well as water pipes while 13% reported the destruction of nearby homes as well, which 
combined (35%) point to a higher level of home destruction than in Ramallah; and with scattered 
answers such as: I cannot describe what I saw, or,  bullets shot into the house. 
 
Of the total, 34% reported that their home was directly exposed to shooting, bombing, and destruction, 
compared to 28% in Ramallah. More than half reported that the shooting was directed to their home’s 
walls, glass, entrances and retaining walls;  a quarter ( Ramallah = one fifth) reported that the army 
occupied their homes, destroyed and broke windows, cupboards, furniture, threw food out of 
cupboards and all over the place and dirtied their homes,  again pointing to the higher severity of 
incidents in Nablus;   2% reported theft by the IDF; and the rest reported destruction of water pipes 
and sewerage.  
 
Of the total households, 50% reported that their homes were searched by the Israeli army (41% for 
Ramallah).  Respondents also reported the arrest of at least one of their family members in 24% of the 
cases, probably during home searches, but not solely.  These are likely to have been temporary arrests 
of course, but certainly add to the weight of fear and terror in the family. Among those with searched 
homes, over half reported that IDF broke the belongings in their homes in the process, with a high of a 
fifth reporting theft of belongings adding weight to the reports on the IDF stealing people’s belongings 
but casting doubt on the assumption that theft was more prevalent in Ramallah. This impression may 
be due to the fact that documentation of theft took place earlier and more precisely than in other towns, 
rather than Ramallah being an exclusive venue where Israeli soldiers engaged in widespread theft.  
These results indicate once again the appearance of a picture of systematic theft, and not only 
destruction and vandalism. 
Asking about the workplace of household members who were working prior to the invasion, 12% 
reported direct damage there, very low in contrast to the high of 41% in Ramallah, perhaps the effect 
of the higher level of indiscriminate violence against homes that took place in Nablus and the assault 
on institutions, particularly ministries, in Ramallah. Again, cars were directly affected by the violence 
in 9% of the cases in Nablus, compared to a high 19% for Ramallah. On the whole, though, these 
results demonstrate that, a consistent pattern of vandalism is beginning to appear, that may be re-
enforced or negated once we analyze the results from the other towns. However, as it stands now, the 
results at hand cannot be justified by the claims of ‘incidental occurrences’ of such awful destruction 
nor ‘security’ considerations. What appears to be the case instead is a systematic attempt and 
destruction, violence and the construction of fear in a very large number of the population. 
 
Medications 
 
A lower than expected 22% of households (Ramallah: 49%) reported a medication availability 
problem during the period. It is not clear why this large discrepancy between households in these two 
communities, but may perhaps pertain to differing household routines and ways of life, with Ramallah 
residents being more ‘urbane’, and less inclined to storage of things at home, and even perhaps more 
inclined to be dependent on medications as a way of life. In addition, Nablus residents may have 
learned from the experience of the earlier Ramallah invasion and stocked up with needed medications. 
Of those with this problem almost half (a quarter for Ramallah) just waited until the siege was over, 
one quarter got help from neighbors and friends ( substitute medications probably),one tenth called the 
Red Crescent,, one twentieth called the UPMRC,  and the rest used indigenous medical practices, or 
managed to reach hospital. Negative ramifications or complications because of the absence of 
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medications was reported by almost half of those who reported problems with medication 
unavailability, with 1/6th specifically reporting out of control diabetes mellitus – increasing in this way 
the risk of future complication on the heart, kidney and eye, among other organs.  Again, the long term 
effects of the sudden interruption of needed medications, especially in the case of difficult to control 
chronic diseases – such as hypertension and diabetes, can only be speculative, yet the reports do 
indicate the need for a study of the consequences of the lack of medications, and perhaps more 
importantly the lack of primary and secondary care among selected groups within the population as an 
important priority research in the near future. 
 
Mental Health 
 
Again in contrast to Ramallah, with the rate of mental health problems reported in households as high 
as 93%, a lower 70% of responded stated that they faced a variety of problems with various members 
of their family. Given the higher severity of the onslaught in Nablus compared to Ramallah, perhaps 
these results are indicative of the ‘awareness’ of the symptoms of the problem, or perhaps willingness 
of respondents to spell out mental health problems without worrying about ‘taboo and image’, that is, 
if our assumption of a more ‘urbane’ and exposed Ramallah is correct. Surely, these differences call 
for further investigation. Of all of the respondents here, a high of 53% reported the problem in terms of 
fear, screaming, crying, inability to eat or sleep and psychological disturbances generally, and 12% 
focused on these symptoms in children especially. When asked about how they managed these 
symptoms and coped with these trying times,  a high of 22% singled out praying as a method of coping 
(Ramallah:6%), followed by a focus on relieving children’s fear, sleeping with them and taking care of 
them at 20%, 17% drew on self control and ability to withstand and only 7% reported watching 
television (probably because the electrical cuts were more severe and longer) playing cards etc., and 
then a range of answers such as’ dealt with the situation as normally’,  drinking indigenous herbs to 
feel better, seeking the help of a counselor, sleeping at the neighbor’s and calling friends and family to 
see if they are all right. 
 
Views on Current Conditions 
 
The last question asked to respondents pertained to their views on the current conditions. Again a high 
of 74% reported views expressing despair and misery over what is happening to their lives 
(Ramallah:71%),  an additional  30% showed great concern over the family’s financial situation,  with 
the rest offering a range of answers such as ‘ Excellent because we deserve what happened to us’,  and 
‘ These are abnormal times, they will come  again’,  ‘God Almighty will make the conditions better’, ‘ 
What Israel and America want will happen’,  ‘ This calls for our insistence on popular resistance’ and 
‘This indicates a crisis in politics, in lack of clear vision and strategy and lack of unity’.  These 
answers combined, and collated with the Ramallah results allows for a picture to emerge focusing on 
the issue of despair as key to understanding the  current state of the population of Palestine, and 
perhaps not only the towns that were studied. Despair, combined with cumulative international and 
overall neglect, want and deprivation can have a marked influence on current behavior and future 
aspirations as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Other than quantifying the phenomena reported by others through qualitative methods and interviews, 
this study demonstrates both similarities and differences in the experiences of ordinary people living in 
Nablus and Ramallah during the Israeli Re-invasion of their areas.  On the one hand, household reports 
indicate a uniformity of experiences that cannot be explained by accidental destruction in the pursuit of 
‘security.’ On the other hand, responses to this terror in Nablus appear to be different from Ramallah 
in ways that social relations, setting and mode of life seem to dictate, and maybe an indication of the 
cultural differences noted between both cities.  Nablus households report having been harder hit than 
Ramallah, confirming earlier reports pertaining to this matter. But the pattern of destruction and 
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vandalism is clear: such rampant destruction and events witnessed by ordinary people cannot be 
simply accepted as accidental or haphazard as the IDF claims. This study demonstrates otherwise, 
given the consistency in reporting specific events, such as the destruction of homes and property, 
breaking household belongings, ruining food supplies, stealing people’s valuables, to name only a few 
clear indicators of an intended policy or an out of control army, or both. 
 
To estimate the number of households and people that were affected by specific serious difficulties in 
dealing with daily life as a consequence of this re-invasion; we are using PCBS’s census report of 
Nablus’ population of 100,231 and 18,003 Households:  
Some calculations that may be useful: 
 
1- Family Composition Change during Exceptional Circumstances 
a- 29% of the respondents reported housing other families and or friends during the reinvasion, that is 
29,067 individuals or 5,221 households. 
 
2- Unavailability of Basic Services 
a- 47% of respondents reported living without electricity that is: 47,109 individuals or 8,461 
households. 
b- 39% of households reported tubed water shortages most or all of the time that is 39,090 individuals 
or 7,021 households. 
 
3- Low on Food and Cash 
a- 37% reported food availability problems during the reinvasion and curfew period that is 37,085 
individuals or 6,661 households. 
b- 33% reported a problem of cash availability that is 33,076 individuals or 5,941 households. 
 
4- Shooting, Explosion and Destruction of Property and Institutions 
a- 57% reported that they endured much of explosions and destruction in their areas during the period, 
almost continuously that is 57,132 individuals 10,262 households. 
b- 67% reported considerable destruction in their neighborhoods that is 67,155 individuals or 12,062 
households. 
 
5- Medications 
a- 22% of households reported a medication availability problem that is 22,051 individuals or 3,961 
households. 
 
6- Mental Health 
a- 70% of responded stated that they faced a variety of mental health in various members of their 
family that is12,602 households. 
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